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DOES THE SUPREME COURT'S CURRENT
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO THE SUPREME
COURT'S CURRENT DOCTRINE OF STARE
DECISIS?
MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN*
This Article asks whether a fair application of the Supreme
Court's current doctrine of stare decisis to the Supreme Court's
current doctrine of stare decisis would counsel in favor of
adhering to current doctrine or departing from it. Professor
Paulsen argues that the paradoxical answer is that current
doctrine of precedent suggests that current doctrine of precedent
disserves all of the doctrine's supposed policy justifications.
Accordingly, the Court's current doctrine of stare decisis may
and should be overruled-according to the Court's current
doctrine of stare decisis.
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INTRODUCTION
What if one were to examine-as if without irony-the stare
decisis effect that the Supreme Court should accord to its own current
doctrine of stare decisis, under a fair application of the Court's
current doctrine of stare decisis, in a case where the result turned on
whether the doctrine of stare decisis should be adhered to as a matter
of stare decisis or not? Would the Court find itself "tested by
following" its own "promise of constancy, once given"?1 Would the
Court (or its doctrine) pass its own test? Or would the Court be
forced to conclude that the doctrine of stare decisis does not meet the
Court's own set of qualifications for when past decisions ought to be
followed? And, if so, what follows from that conclusion?
In this short Article, I propose to examine, as if it could be taken
seriously, the Supreme Court's current stated doctrine of stare decisis,
as most comprehensively formulated and defended in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey2 and as exercised
(or deviated from) in several prominent constitutional decisions of
the Court in the fifteen years since Casey was decided. I propose to
do so not from the standpoint of first premises,3 but from the more
1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
2. See id. at 854-69.
3. I have examined the doctrine of stare decisis in constitutional law from the
perspective of first premises of constitutional text, structure, and history, as well as from
the perspective of early precedent (specifically, the argument for judicial review under
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)), in other writing. See, e.g.,
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1548-49 n.38 (2000)
[hereinafter Paulsen, Abrogating] (suggesting that stare decisis is unconstitutional and
collecting authorities supporting this proposition); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James
T Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from
the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 679-81 (1995) [hereinafter Paulsen,
Captain James T. Kirk] (arguing that, to the extent that the doctrine is not a hoax, it is
flatly unconstitutional); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
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limited perspective of the Court's own doctrine of stare decisis. My
analysis and critique here is thus an "internal" one-does the doctrine
satisfy its own standards and purported justification?-rather than the
"external" one of consistency with first principles of the Constitution.
My conclusion, as one might guess from the framing of the question,
is that the Court's doctrine about precedent fails its own test(s) of
when precedents should be adhered to. Indeed, the doctrine fails all
of the doctrine's own tests: It is embarrassingly unworkable. It
certainly has not spawned reasonable reliance on the doctrine and
practice of stare decisis continuing to remain stable; to the contrary,
the Court's subsequent decisions have cast doubt on the content of
the doctrine and seemingly left its stare decisis analysis a remnant of
abandoned doctrine. Changed factual circumstances cast some mild
doubt on the validity of the doctrine, but the doctrine of stare decisis
was never really much about facts in the first place. Finally, the
Court's announced doctrine of stare decisis probably does not much
contribute to, and in fact may well detract from, public perceptions of
"judicial integrity," at least if one assumes a reasonably informed,
intelligent, and not-hopelessly-naive public. In short, the doctrine
serves poorly, if at all, the supposed rule-of-law values of promoting
efficiency and stability, protecting reasonable reliance, and enhancing
judicial credibility-the values asserted to justify the doctrine. The
end result of this inquiry is that the current doctrine of stare decisis
does not require adherence to the current doctrine of stare decisis.
The doctrine may be repudiated, consistently with the doctrine.
I do not here address at any length for it appears to be no part of
the Court's current doctrine of stare decisis-whether the current
doctrine of stare decisis is right or wrong, on interpretive criteria
apart from considerations of stare decisis.4 The whole point of the
doctrine, after all, is to address when the Court should adhere to its
prior decisions "whether or not mistaken" according to other possible
criteria for constitutional adjudication.' It is therefore immaterial,
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT 289, 289 (2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Intrinsically
Corrupting] (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis always corrupts whatever one
otherwise would regard as the correct method of constitutional interpretation); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2706, 2731-34
(2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth] (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis
is unconstitutional to the extent it has true substantive effect, under the reasoning of
Marbury).
4. As noted, I address this proposition in other writing. See supra note 3.
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857; see Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1538 n.8 (defining
the essence of the doctrine of stare decisis as one of adherence to decisions presumed to
be wrong according to other interpretive criteria) (collecting authorities). See generally
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under the doctrine of stare decisis, for purposes of considering the
stare decisis weight to be accorded the doctrine of stare decisis,
whether the doctrine is sound.
All of this of course creates something of a quandary: If the
doctrine of stare decisis suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis may
(and perhaps should) be overruled or modified, precisely what should
replace it? If the current doctrine of stare decisis is incoherent, what
criteria should one apply to create a doctrine replacing or modifying
it?
A short Article admits of a simple roadmap: Part I attempts to
describe the Court's current doctrine of stare decisis. The truly
impatient reader may feel tempted to skip the set-up, if already
familiar with the current doctrine. But I offer this caveat: to describe
the doctrine accurately which is my goal in this Part-is already, to a
significant degree, to present the argument for its internal
incoherence. Grant my description of current doctrine, and
everything else follows. Accordingly, I spend more time on this Part
than the others. Part II is, in form, the core of the argument, but it
proceeds briskly; the wind-up takes more time than the actual pitch. I
apply the current doctrine of stare decisis to the current doctrine of
stare decisis and conclude that stare decisis does not require adhering
to stare decisis in its current form. Squaring this odd interpretive
circle, I suggest that the doctrine of stare decisis is almost entirely
judicial bootstrap, a conclusion that in turn has important
implications for the legitimacy of decisions that rest on its invocation
by the Court and, ironically, for the legitimacy of the Court that
invokes it as a doctrine designed to enhance its own legitimacy. Part
III poses pointed concluding questions about what to do with a
doctrine that fails all its own criteria and what doctrine should replace
it. Would not the creation of a new, revised doctrine of stare decisis,
conflict with whichever new, revised doctrine of stare decisis is sought
to be created? Is there any sensible way out of the Court's current
doctrine?
I. THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF STARE DECIsIS
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
decided in 1992, is, somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court's first
systematic attempt to set forth a general theory of the role of
Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting, supra note 3 (arguing that stare decisis is always a
departure from, or qualification of, some other interpretive theory about how the
Constitution properly should be understood and applied).
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precedent and "stare decisis" in constitutional adjudication. The
Court had, of course, discussed the idea of stare decisis, and had
invoked precedent, many, many times before. But one searches the
first 500 volumes of the U.S. Reports in vain for a full-blown theory or
doctrine of precedent. Think about it: after over 200 years in
operation, Casey, in 1992, is the Court's first grand theology of
precedent!
But Casey, barely fifteen years old as of this writing, is already
not quite the Court's last word on the subject. Recent cases
subsequent to Casey have treated the doctrine too, embracing Casey's
treatment or distinguishing it in some manner, persuasive or not. If
one is attempting to describe the "current doctrine of stare decisis,"
Casey is a good starting point and a proper prime focus of the inquiry,
but it has to be taken in light of the glosses, modifications, and
applications of subsequent decisions.
A. Three Preliminaries
Before digging into Casey's explication of the factors comprising
the doctrine, it may be useful to clear the doctrine of potentially
confusing underbrush. I therefore begin with three straightforward,
preliminary observations about the doctrine.
First, the doctrine of stare decisis is not constitutionally required,
in any sense, and has never been so understood. Nothing in Article
III of the Constitution (or in any other provision of the Constitution)
mandates a practice of adherence to precedent; nothing in Article III
specifies any rule or set of criteria for when a court should, must, or
may follow a prior decision.6
Nor does anything in Article III (or in any other provision of the
Constitution) grant a power to the judiciary to prescribe binding rules
that require future members of the judiciary to follow precedents.7
Indeed, to infer such a power would almost certainly be inconsistent
with the probable claimed source of such power: If "[tihe judicial
Power"8 entails a power of courts to vest their decisions with
prospective, quasi-legislative binding force-that is, if the judicial
power of case-decision entails a power to prescribe binding rules of
law-it is hard to see how the exercise of such power legitimately
6. Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1537 & n.1 (collecting cases and authorities);
id. at 1543-51 (collecting and discussing the Court's statements that stare decisis is a rule
of policy, not a requirement of the Constitution).
7. Id. at 1570-82.
8. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
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could be binding on future possessors of that same judicial power,
who presumably have the same power to vest their decisions with
authority. If courts legitimately can make constitutional law with
their decisions, subsequent courts may repeal such enactments. If
courts' interpretations of law purport merely to describe what has
always been, is now, and ever shall be the objectively correct
interpretation of the Constitution (or other law), it still would not
imply that precisely the same interpretive power is thereby taken
away from subsequent courts that might disagree with the supposedly
objectively correct prior interpretation.'
And, to repeat, the Court has never so asserted. Rather, as the
Court has said countless times, the doctrine of stare decisis is one of
policy and practice only, not a strict rule of law or an inherent
prescriptive power of the judiciary to bind present or future courts
with its past decisions.1" To be sure, the Court could (one supposes)
change its mind about this, too. But it would be quite hard to
reconcile such an action with the enhanced notion of stare decisis
thereby created; the act of creation would contradict the creation-an
irony to which I return at the close of this Article. For now, it is
sufficient to note that the judicial doctrine of stare decisis does not
regard the judicial doctrine of stare decisis as being of constitutional
dimension. To newly invent such a status would be, well,
unprecedented."
A second preliminary point can be stated more briefly: Stare
decisis has never been thought absolute in American jurisprudence.
It is a policy consideration, not an "inexorable command."12  The
9. Cf Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting, supra note 3, at 292-93 (arguing that an
approach to constitutional interpretation "under which judges' decisions are themselves
constitutive of constitutional meaning" cannot logically justify a doctrine of stare decisis
under which a prior year's judicial decisions are more constitutive of constitutional
meaning than a present year's judicial decisions). Similarly, one Congress cannot
constitutionally purport to bar a subsequent Congress from repealing its legislative
enactments, or otherwise limit a future Congress's ability to do so (except in the limited
sense that there may be certain actions that, once taken, cannot be undone by a simple
legislative repeal). The short point: Neither Congress nor the courts can make a rock so
big that subsequent possessors of the same legislative or judicial power cannot move it.
10. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1537 n.1 & 1543-51 (collecting such
statements).
11. For similar reasons, of course, my argument cannot depend on what the judiciary
has said about the doctrine of stare decisis. I merely note that the judiciary's own
articulation of the doctrine agrees with the position I have set forth.
12. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997) (collecting cases and stating that
adherence to precedent is "not an inexorable command" but "a policy judgment").
Agostini is one of a great many cases, before and after Casey, that have made such a
statement. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1537 n.1.
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force of precedent is not strict. Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis is
not constitutionally required and, even as a doctrine of mere policy,
has never been regarded as absolute.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
embraces both of these first two observations. In Casey, the Court's
discussion of the doctrine begins with the concession that stare decisis
is a rule of judicial policy thought to be dictated by considerations of
practicality.13 While the doctrine is championed as serving rule-of-law
values, adherence to precedent has never been regarded as itself a
strict rule of law. In America, the binding prospective force of
precedent has never been thought absolute. Courts overrule cases.14
Indeed, Casey itself overruled two of them. 5
The third preliminary point is slightly more difficult-defining
exactly what is meant by the term stare decisis. We know it is a rule
of practice and policy, not commanded by the Constitution or the
product of a constitutionally delegated power. And we know it is not,
and never has been, an absolute policy or practice. What, then,
defines the essence of the doctrine? What is the non-absolute policy
or practice to which the doctrine refers?
The short answer is that the doctrine of stare decisis is the
judicial policy of (sometimes) adhering to a prior decision irrespective
of the prior decision's legal correctness according to other interpretive
criteria. As Casey put it fairly bluntly, it is the practice of adhering to
a prior decision "whether or not mistaken."' 6  What defines the
doctrine of stare decisis as a judicial practice-what gives the doctrine
any punch at all-is adherence to what a court, by hypothesis,
otherwise would regard as an erroneous exposition of the law. This
distinguishes the doctrine of stare decisis from a milder doctrine of
precedent as serving the more modest role of providing relevant
interpretive information (the informed, considered views of prior,
presumably competent interpreters) or serving as a starting point or
baseline against which a departure ought to be justified or
explained. 7 The Supreme Court's current doctrine of stare decisis
13. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("The obligation
to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.").
14. Id. at 854-69.
15. Id. at 882, overruling, in part, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
16. Id. at 857. For more detailed discussion, see Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at
1538 & n.8; and Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting, supra note 3, at 289-90 & nn.1-2.
17. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1544-46 (distinguishing between the
"information" function of precedent and the "disposition" function of precedent and
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contemplates something more than mere consideration of prior cases'
reasoning and conclusions; it is a doctrine about the judicial policy or
practice of adhering, sometimes, to a decision a court would
otherwise feel fully justified in concluding was legally wrong.
The trick, then, for the Court in Casey, was to explain when and
why precedent should be followed, and when and why it need not,
apart from consideration of the precedent's correctness:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. 8
Both sides of the equation were involved in the Casey decision, which
ended up reaffirming Roe v. Wade 9 largely on the theory that stare
decisis required such action yet overruled two of its decisions
applying Roe on the theory that stare decisis permitted overruling
those cases.2°
To the "prudential and pragmatic" end of informing the Court's
judgment about which way to go in a particular instance, Casey
identified a cluster of factors, interrelated and overlapping in some
respects, relevant to the decision whether or not to overrule a prior
decision. There are four primary, identified factors, plus an
additional set of prudential, policy, and (seemingly) political
judgments to lay on top of the more-legal factors. None is treated as
dispositive; none is identified as essential; the relative weight of each
is unclear. In short, current doctrine consists of a classic multifactor
balancing test of incommensurable considerations. Let us consider
each element in turn.
B. The Current Doctrine: When Should Wrong Precedent Be
Followed (and When May It Be Overruled)?
1. Workability
First, Casey says, courts must consider the "workability" of a
precedent decision or line of decisions.2' A rule announced in a prior
identifying the core of the doctrine of stare decisis as involving the disposition function
quite apart from, and even in contradiction of, the information function).
18. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See supra note 15.
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
1172 [Vol. 86
2008] DOES STARE DECISIS REQUIRE STARE DECISIS? 1173
case may have "proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability. '22  The Court did not elaborate at length, but cited,
perhaps instructively, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority's23 overruling of National League of Cities v. Usery24 on the
ground (among others) that the Tenth Amendment test created by
the Court in National League of Cities for invalidating congressional
legislation otherwise within the scope of an enumerated power was
not susceptible of principled application, but rather seemed to
partake too much of ad hoc policy judgments. Casey then
summarized "workability," perhaps a bit cryptically, as a question of
whether "the required determinations fall within judicial
competence. "26
In some respects, "workability" resembles some of the Court's
inquiries in applying the so-called "political question" doctrine: a
precedent or line of precedents, just like a new, contemplated judicial
intervention, tends to be thought "unworkable" where there exist no
readily discoverable, judicially manageable standards to guide judicial
discretion or where the purported "rule" supplied by precedent seems
to require judicial policy determinations of a kind not appropriate for
courts to be making.27  Precedents that call for inquiries and line-
drawing not "within judicial competence" tend to be unworkable.
This accords with common sense, and with experience: nebulous,
vague, judicially crafted standards not well-rooted in legal texts or
traditions tend to generate inconsistent applications, which then
generate their own problems of faithful application and render the
stated standard unworkable in practice.
On the other hand, not all constitutional provisions state clear,
bright-line determinate rules. Some obviously create standards that
generate uncertainties of application that might be thought to land in
22. Id. at 854.
23. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
24. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546, overruling Nat'l League of
Cities, 426 U.S. 833). The page of Garcia cited in Casey noted the problem with judicial
tests that "invite[] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546. The Garcia Court
overruled National League of Cities's announced rule as "unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice." Id.
26. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
27. The standard modern formulation of the political question doctrine is set forth in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228-29 (1993). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 713 (1993)
(noting, discussing, and criticizing the political question doctrine).
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the neighborhood of "workability" problems. Presumably, a court
could not properly discard a correct interpretation of a nebulous
constitutional provision-an interpretation that accurately captured
the provision's imprecise content-in favor of a more-workable but
less-faithful interpretation. A difficult, unruly standard might well be
the correct interpretation of an imprecise constitutional text (or at
least no worse a standard than the text itself). It would seem, then,
that as to judicial precedent, too, workability concerns, standing
alone, are probably not a sufficient reason to overrule precedent.28
Another value, closely aligned with "workability," may lurk
behind the workability label: judicial efficiency. The Court's
discussion of stare decisis in Casey, before plowing through specific
factors one at a time, began with the idea of efficiency, noting that the
idea of following precedent "begins with necessity, and a contrary
necessity marks its outer limit."29 The judicial system simply could
not do society's work, the Court said, if it had to re-invent the wheel
each time an issue came before it.3" Precedent is a shortcut. It
permits the judge to cut to the chase; the interpreter need not act as if
no one had thought about this issue before. In this respect,
precedent, and a doctrine of stare decisis, is a judicial helpmate, a
super-duper law clerk helping judges dispose of easy cases more
easily.
But this only works if a precedent ably and reliably serves the
interpretive shortcut function. Where a precedent's rule is unclear, or
its application hopelessly uncertain, it does not save work but
multiplies it. Not only must the judge read the governing legal text,
but now he or she must study a fuzzy precedent and try to discern its
rule or principle, figure out how it applies to the case at hand, and
(given that stare decisis is not absolute) figure out whether it is at
least a satisfactory explication of the legal text it purports to interpret.
And one more thing yet: The judge must look at subsequent cases
applying, extending, refining, distinguishing, limiting, or themselves
trying to figure out the precedent case. This often generates a body
of precedents to be reconciled, clarified, explained, distinguished, or
selectively ignored. All of a sudden, the supposed efficiency gain of a
system of precedent and stare decisis vanishes in the haze. Workable,
clear rules derived from precedent create useful efficiency gains for
the judicial process. Unworkable, unclear, inconsistent rules derived
28. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1552.
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
30. Id. ("[Wie recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each
issue afresh in every case that raised it.").
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from precedent create efficiency drags. This may have been, in part,
what the Court was getting at in Casey when it began its stare decisis
discussion by noting that resort to precedent was "indispensable" as a
general proposition, but could not be absolute, because sometimes a
precedent's errors or unclarity become so well recognized by courts
that they become obstacles to be evaded, and their enforcement is
"doomed."3
The Court in Casey did not say quite all of this. Rather, what it
said was that unworkability was a factor that could permit overruling
a prior decision or line of decisions-or, at least, a factor that might
explain some of the Court's prior precedents that themselves had
overruled prior precedents. The Court did not state whether
unworkability was sufficient to justify overruling a precedent. Nor
did the Court say whether unworkability was necessary to overrule a
precedent, except perhaps by negative implication from the fact that
it is not the only factor the Court discussed. Finally, the Court did not
specify how much weight should be accorded this factor.
"Workability" as articulated in Casey seems to consist primarily of a
very general, gestalt sense of whether the Court believes it can work
effectively within a framework established by a prior decision, plus an
unresolved question of how much weight to accord a positive or
negative evaluation on this point.32
To distill and refine: the inquiry into workability appears to ask
whether the rule of a precedent decision, besides being wrong, has
tended to generate inconsistent applications, fostered unclarity and
uncertainty, or proven difficult to manage in any kind of principled
way-and on such account should be regarded as intolerable.
"Workability" is not a hard-and-fast standard.
Moreover, that standard does not always even come into play in
the first place. As noted above-and as illustrated by abundant
examples in judicial practice before and since Casey-a finding of
unworkability is not necessary for the Court to overrule a prior case.
It is possible for a prior holding to be perfectly workable, but yet, in
the Court's judgment, simply wrong. The holding of Bowers v.
Hardwick33 ('There is no substantive due process constitutional right
to homosexual conduct!') is a perfectly workable bright-line rule,
31. Id.
32. Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1552 ("The inquiry into 'workability,' as
framed by the Court, is essentially a question of whether the Court believes itself able to
continue working within a framework established by a prior decision. The unworkability
of precedent provides additional incentive for the judiciary to overrule it.").
33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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readily susceptible of straightforward application, yielding no
uncertainty or manageability problems. The holding of Lawrence v.
Texas' ('Oh yes, there is!') scraps Bowers because the Court thought
it wrong, not unworkable.35 Atkins v. Virginia 6 held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids capital punishment of mentally retarded
murderers, overruling Penry v. Lynaugh37 which held that it did not.
In like manner, Roper v. Simmons38 held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited execution of minors, overruling Stanford v. Kentucky,39
which held that it did not. Atkins did not find Penry unworkable;
Penry's rule was bright-line, clear, unequivocal, and involved no
invention of standardless factors. Rather, Atkins merely disagreed
with Penry's holding.4 0 Likewise, Roper did not find Stanford's rule
unworkable or unclear. It merely thought it should no longer be
considered controlling."' In earlier death penalty cases, the Court
likewise had overruled precedents excluding victim-impact statements
from sentencing proceedings, not because the exclusion rule was
34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35. Id. at 578. The Court in Lawrence bowed-perfunctorily, unclearly, and
unpersuasively-in the general direction of workability, see id. at 577 ("Bowers itself
causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance contradict its central
holding."), but the point of that sentence seems more directed to the claim that Bowers
was an aberration and that one should regard the body of precedents as being in conflict-
a different stare decisis factor I discuss below. See infra text accompanying notes 58-78. It
is not really a point about the rule of the case itself being hard to understand or apply. In
the end, the Court in Lawrence overruled Bowers straightforwardly on the ground that it
disagreed with the majority in Bowers and agreed with the dissenters. See Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 577-78 ("The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful analysis ... Justice
Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control
here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not
to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
36. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
37. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
38. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
39. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
40. Atkins, 536 U.S at 314 ("Much has changed since then.").
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 ("Stanford v. Kentucky should be deemed no longer
controlling on this issue."). The Court did not, in either Atkins or Roper, hold that the
overruled precedents were wrong when decided, but that social facts had changed and that
this changed the meaning of the Constitution as applied. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307, 315,
318, 321; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Justice Scalia made this point, angrily, in his dissent in
Roper. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Bound down, indeed. What a
mockery today's opinion makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the Court's
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years-not,
mind you, that this Court's decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has
changed."). Scalia's point, shorn of his vitriol, is essentially right. The Roper majority held
not that Stanford was wrong, but that "[t]o the extent Stanford was based on review of the
objective indicia of consensus that obtain in 1989 . .. ,it suffices to note that those indicia
have changed." Id. at 574 (majority opinion).
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unclear, standardless, vague, or unpredictable in some way-the
exclusion was perfectly bright-line-but because a majority concluded
that the earlier decisions simply were wrong.42 Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peha,43 overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' similarly
rested on the view that Metro Broadcasting departed from proper
analysis on the merits, not that that departure had proved
unworkable in any sense.45 The list could continue, but the point is
sufficiently made: unworkability is not a prerequisite to the Court's
overruling of a case, even under the Court's own analysis.
"Workability" thus remains a factor. But it is hard to say much
more beyond that. It is a factor of unclear weight and unclear
application. It is perhaps fair to say, generally, that the more
standardless, variable, and difficult-to-apply the holding of a
particular case; the less it tends to yield predictable, principled results;
the more unworkable that rule is; the greater the justification for
discarding it. But a decision need not be unworkable to be overruled,
and an unworkable decision need not be overruled.
2. Reliance
Casey's second factor in weighing the relative costs of reaffirming
or overruling is whether a prior decision's rule "is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation."46  As to
"special hardship," the Court invoked the "cost of a rule's
42. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991), overruling Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Payne, decided
the year before Casey, briefly collected and set forth a list of stare decisis considerations
and propositions from earlier cases. (In that sense, it might be thought a "proto-Casey" in
terms of development of a "doctrine" of stare decisis, but with the singular difference that
these factors were gathered in support of the Court's authority to overrule problematic
precedents, rather than an obligation to reaffirm them.) Among these factors, the Court
in Payne noted that "when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned," the
Court has not thought it obligatory to follow them. See id. at 827 (emphasis added). A
few sentences later, the Court hinted that Booth and Gathers might be thought to have
"defied consistent application by the lower courts," but the overwhelming thrust of the
Court's decision to overrule was obviously its view that the earlier cases were "badly
reasoned"-that is, simply wrongly decided. See id. at 830 ("Reconsidering these
decisions now, we conclude, for the reasons heretofore stated, that they were wrongly
decided and should be, and now are, overruled.").
43. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
44. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
45. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227, overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
46. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,854 (1992).
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repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on
the rule's continued application. 47
The core of the reliance inquiry posed by Casey (and subsequent
cases) asks whether a precedent, notwithstanding being wrong,
nonetheless has generated reasonable, justified, vested reliance in its
continuation, such that it would be unfair in some sense, or work a
special hardship, to overrule even such a wrong decision. The classic
case, frequently noted by the Court, is where a legal rule has created
substantial investment-backed expectations, such that shifting it
would feel like Lucy pulling the football away from Charlie Brown,
once the full force of his leg and body had become invested in the
legitimate expectation of kicking it.48
The notion has a powerful intuitive appeal. It also has
considerable legitimacy. But again, protecting legitimate, reasonable
reliance interests is not an absolute rule. More fundamentally, it is
not all that clear how reasonable it really is to rely on "reliance." It is
just a factor and one of unclear weight and uncertain application. The
simple fact is that legal rules change all the time. Legislatures are
constantly creating new legal rules. These often frustrate well-
informed prior expectations, causing folks to lose money they had
invested or forcing them to invest some they had not planned on
investing. This is what governments do: they upset prior
expectations. Yet, no one thinks that this somehow gives those
aggrieved by the new rule some vested legal right in the continuation
of the prior legal regime. 9 Can one imagine the laughter (and
sanctions) that would greet the lawyers for a polluting firm arguing
that a new statute imposing stricter pollution controls was invalid and
could not be applied to their client because the client had banked on
the prior law remaining in force and not being changed? And well-
deserved that greeting would be. The Court has held (rightly) that
47. Id. at 855-56.
48. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (asserting that reliance
interests are at their height in cases involving contract and property rights-true instances
of investment-backed expectations); CHARLES M. SCHULZ, PEANUTS TREASURY (1968)
(unnumbered successive pages in middle of anthology) (Lucy stating "I guarantee that the
only thing that will make me pull the ball away this year will be an involuntary muscle
spasm"-which then somehow occurred); id. (Lucy promising that she would not pull the
ball away and agreeing to "shake on it," but subsequently asserting that "[a] woman's
handshake is not legally blinding"). As I observe below, the Supreme Court is as reliable
as Lucy, and litigants' reliance on the Court's decisions is fully as reasonable as Charlie
Brown's reliance on Lucy.
49. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1554 ("The fact of reliance does not
create a vested right in the prior legal regime; nor does it supply a basis for a court to
refuse to apply a new rule of law, if that is what is otherwise required.").
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there is no constitutional legal right to have one's reasonable reliance
interests prevail over a prospective change in the applicable legal
rule.5 0
What is true for legislative lawmaking is also true for judicial
decisionmaking. Given that the courts have said, too many times to
count, that the idea of stare decisis is not, and never has been, one of
absolute adherence to a prior decision, and given the innumerable
times that the Supreme Court has reconsidered and overruled its
prior constitutional interpretations, there is not much more reason to
expect that any given judicial interpretation will not change than
there is to expect that a legislature will not enact a new statute.
Only a fool or a sucker-like Charlie Brown relying on Lucy-
would count on the legal rule remaining firmly in place. The better
bet, frequently, is that it will not. In each case, whether the legal rule
will remain the same is largely a matter of informed prediction.
Someone knowledgeable about legislative politics will be able to
approximate the likelihood of a particular legislative change.
Likewise, a good lawyer will be able to approximate the likelihood of
a change in judicial interpretation of the law in a given area.
Constitutional law is no different from any other area in this respect;
if anything, the likelihood of change is even easier to predict and
more accessible to the general understanding of non-specialists.
One might distinguish between such "predictive reliance"-the
discount that informed observers reasonably would apply to a
particular legal rule remaining the same-and what I would call
"stare decisis reliance"-the amount of additional reliance that might
be generated by virtue of the fact of having a judicial doctrine of stare
decisis. The former reliance is largely reasonable, if perhaps small
and hard to measure with certainty. The latter form of reliance is
probably almost entirely unreasonable in practice and utterly defies
rational measurement. Given how factor-contingent, variable,
uncertain, and discretionary (some might even say arbitrary) the
50. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1994) ("Although Carlton's
reliance is uncontested-and the reading of the original statute on which he relied appears
to have been correct-his reliance alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation.... An entirely prospective change in the law may disturb the relied-upon
expectations of individuals, but such a change would not be deemed therefore to be
violative of due process."); see also Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)
(holding that substantive law cannot be permitted to change depending upon the equities
of particular parties' claims of actual reliance on a prior legal rule that the party expected
to remain unchanged).
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doctrine of stare decisis is, how much reasonable reliance can it really
generate? Certainly not very much, if any.5"
To some extent, this observation anticipates my critique, in the
next Part, of the doctrine of stare decisis as applied to the doctrine of
stare decisis. But one might as well begin unraveling a circular
argument at any point on the circle: reliance, as that factor is
employed in stare decisis, is little different from the argument one
might employ with respect to an undesired legislative change in the
law, and no more worthy of protection. Anything else-"stare decisis
reliance"-is pure bootstrap, created by the existence of a doctrine of
stare decisis in the first place.
What's more, it is hopelessly unclear how big a bootstrap it is.
Under the current doctrine of stare decisis, it is uncertain precisely
what should count as reasonable reliance and how much it should
count, as weighed against correction of an erroneous rule of law
embodied in a precedent. The Court has sometimes moved beyond
the paradigm of "sunk cost," investment-backed-expectations type of
reliance and embraced what might be termed "social reliance"-that
is, the way people have come to assume things will be. That is not
really "reliance" in the traditional sense. But Casey appears to
broaden the inquiry, framing the question of reliance as whether
changing a legal interpretation to correct a perceived error would
cause "significant damage to the stability of the society governed by"
the rule in question.52 Pause on that formulation for a moment:
51. I must acknowledge a very strange "but see" to this proposition. Justice Scalia,
concurring in part and dissenting in part in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992), declared, almost inexplicably: "It is my view, in short, that reliance upon a square,
unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance (though reliance
alone may not always carry the day)." Id. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Further, Scalia stated that the Court "ought not visit economic
hardship upon those who took us at our word" and could not fairly demand of private
parties that they "anticipate our overrulings" when, after all, the Supreme Court directs
lower courts not to do so. Id. All of this from Scalia in the same Term as Casey!
Ironically, such promise-of-constancy-once-given-ish, tested-by-following-esque language
could have been cited by the Casey majority in support of its stare decisis analysis.
Compare id., with Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
The only thing that saves Scalia's Quill scribblings from absurdity is the
parenthetical concession that "reliance alone may not always carry the day"-a
recognition that reliance interests are not, and cannot be, an absolute trump card. But it is
hard to fathom how Scalia would think, in light of the Court's practice of selective stare
decisis and its demonstrated willingness to overrule cases, that it would be reasonable for a
private party to rely, in any strong sense, on the Court's not overruling one of its
precedents in any given situation, especially where there is a reasonable, informed basis
for predicting it might well do so.
52. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
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damage to the stability of society governed by the rule in question.
This embraces more, it would seem, than special individual reliance
interests; it recognizes as part of protected "reliance" interests the
more diffuse expectation that things will remain as they are.
The Court in Casey appeared to mean just that. For there is the
same notion, popping up rather prominently a few pages later, as
applied to Roe v. Wade:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that
define their views of themselves and their places in society, in
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail.53
This is not investment-based reliance; it is sheer expectation that a
legal rule will remain the same because a prospective change is
contrary to people's "views of themselves" and their desire to
maintain the availability of abortion as a method of backup birth
control.54
The same notion appears in Dickerson v. United States,5 which
declined, in part because of stare decisis, to overrule Miranda v.
Arizona,56 noting that Miranda warnings had "become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture."57 By "part of our national culture" the
Court meant familiarity-gained from watching too many TV cop
shows, perhaps-not reliance in any vested, sunk-cost sense. It is not
that criminal suspects have engaged in certain conduct they otherwise
might not have engaged in, in reliance on Miranda's protections
shielding them from making unwitting incriminating comments
during custodial interrogation. It is that the warnings have become so
familiar that everyone expects them to be read. (Of course, one might
then think the warnings presumably are so familiar that a suspect
would not need to have the warnings read to him in order to know his
rights; he would just miss them terribly.)
53. Id. at 856.
54. I have suggested in earlier writing, half-facetiously, that, to the extent that Casey
was genuinely concerned with individual reliance interests in the abortion context, a rule
could be fashioned that would "grandfather" in a change only after a nine-month gestation
period. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1555 n.53.
55. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
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Other times, however, the Court clearly has not credited such
social reliance interests as part of its stare decisis calculus. Lawrence
v. Texas is a prominent example. "The holding in Bowers," wrote
Justice Kennedy for the Court, "has not induced detrimental reliance
comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are
involved. Indeed, there has been no individual or societal reliance on
Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding
once there are compelling reasons to do so."58 It is easy to take shots
at this vapid, vacuous analysis of reliance-and Justice Scalia's dissent
did so with his characteristic barbed effectiveness-for it is
embarrassingly inconsistent with Casey's approach.59 Casey posits
that if a meaningful segment of society has come to count on the
Court's maintenance of a particular legal interpretation, or simply
become comfortably accustomed to it, that itself counts as a reason
for reaffirming it, lest the Court be seen as breaching faith with those
who have developed such expectations.6° The fact of pervasive
disagreement with, criticism of, and resistance to, the Court's initial
decision is not a legitimate reason to fail to protect such social-
expectations reliance, said the Court in Casey. Indeed, quite the
opposite, it is a reason for the Court most emphatically to maintain its
course, whether or not mistaken.61 In Lawrence, it is almost exactly
the reverse: the fact of disagreement with and criticism of Bowers is a
reason to discard it, not reaffirm it; and societal reliance is disparaged,
downplayed, and discounted.62 The conflict between Lawrence and
Casey on this score does not say which one's approach is right; it
simply points out that the Court sometimes accords social reliance
significant weight and sometimes it does not. (The cynic might be
inclined to say that the choice depends on the Court's social policy
preferences.)
63
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (emphasis added).
59. See id. at 591-92 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (pointing out, among other things, "[w]hat
a massive disruption of the current social order ... the overruling of Bowers entails" and
concluding that Lawrence "expose[s] Casey's extraordinary deference to precedent for the
result-oriented expedient that it is").
60. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
61. Id. at 866-67.
62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
63. For the record, I think Casey's approach to stare decisis is wrong. I have no
quarrel with the fact that Lawrence did not adhere to Bowers simply on grounds of stare
decisis. Lawrence's treatment of Casey's discussion of stare decisis is obviously
disingenuous and result-driven, however. I think that both Casey and Lawrence are
wrongly decided on the merits, for the simple, straightforward, independent-of-stare-
decisis reason that nothing in the text, structure, or historical understanding of the written
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On certain issues, it would be virtually unthinkable to allow
social reliance to override a conclusion that a prior decision was
wrong. Can one seriously imagine, let alone defend, a decision in
Brown v. Board of Education' reaffirming Plessy v. Ferguson65
"whether or not mistaken" and "with whatever degree of personal
reluctance any of us may have,"66 on the ground that such
considerable societal reliance, social expectations, and patterns of
conduct (in addition to investment of resources) had been built up
around the rule of separate-but-equal that it ought not, in fairness, be
disturbed?67
It thus seems that the "reliance" thread of current doctrine can
be summarized, not unfairly, as follows: Current doctrine treats
reliance interests, of different kinds, as counseling, sometimes, to
some extent, in favor of adhering to a decision otherwise thought to
be wrong on independent interpretive criteria. Like workability,
reliance is a factor, but one of uncertain content and uncertain weight.
Constitution supports the claim of a constitutional right to either abortion or homosexual
conduct that is immune from government regulation.
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857, 861.
67. My former student, Dan Rosen, and I mockingly proposed such a position as a
satire of Casey, shortly after the decision came out, in the form of the pretended discovery
of a preliminary draft of Brown that did the unthinkable: reaffirm Plessy on grounds of
stare decisis. See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown, Casey-Style: The
Shocking First Draft of the Segregation Opinion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1287 (1994). Here's
the social reliance issue, taking Casey's words and applying them to segregation:
The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a rule's repudiation as it would fall
on those who have relied reasonably on the rule's continued application. Since the
classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule
occurs in the commercial context, it is no cause for surprise that some would find
no reliance worthy of consideration in support of Plessy, which merely affirms the
constitutionality of state laws governing social arrangements. This argument
appears premised on the hypothesis that social arrangements can be changed
virtually immediately.
But this simply refuses to face the fact that for at least six decades of economic
and social developments, people in vast regions of the Nation have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society in reliance on the segregation of the races and Plessy's
affirmation of the constitutionality of segregation by local law or custom. The
ability of the races to assume their proper roles in society has been facilitated by
the stability of the social regimes in which they live and on which they have come
to depend. The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance
on Plessy cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling
Plessy for people who have ordered their thinking and living around the holding of
that case be dismissed.
Id. at 1293-94.
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It perhaps can be said of the reliance factor, charitably, that the more
that a legal rule has remained clear, stable, reasonably determinate,
and certain in its application, and essentially uncontested over a
sustained period of time, the more it will tend to have produced
reasonable reliance; the more that such reasonable reliance has (then)
tended to induce past, sunk action on the part of individuals, or
institutions, that would require an enormous expenditure of
resources, impose costs, or cause serious social or other dislocation in
order to reverse or undo, the stronger the argument for protection of
reliance interests.
But through all this, the Plessy problem remains and looms large.
Plessy was as wrong as wrong precedent can be. Yet, the summary of
reliance in the preceding paragraph does offer a pretty good
argument for protecting the vested social, cultural, and even
commercial reliance interests in maintaining segregation. Separate-
but-equal was, for more than half a century, a clear, stable, and
reasonably determinate rule. Cases were presented as to application
of that rule-when separate was not equal in fact. But the rule itself
was not unclear and much social conduct revolved around its stability,
including actual sunk costs along with societal expectations. And as
the long battle over desegregation for the half century after Brown
abundantly demonstrates, undoing Plessy's rule was not an easy day's
work, but involved enormous expenditure of resources, social
dislocation, and human cost. If "reliance" and stability interests ever
should counsel against overruling a precedent, under the reasoning of
Casey, Plessy would have been such a case. But that cannot possibly
be right, can it?
The doctrinal escape hatch from this doctrinal problem-simply
treating reliance considerations as a factor, not as dispositive-creates
another problem. Under current doctrine, the need to correct error
sometimes trumps reliance interests. But sometimes it does not. And
there appears no clear rule or standard to identify when a case is of
one type rather than another. That is the state of current reliance
doctrine.
3. Remnant of Abandoned Doctrine
Casey's third identified factor is whether a precedent decision's
premises, analysis, or holding have been significantly (or significantly
enough) undermined by a subsequent case or by subsequent cases
that the precedent has become a "doctrinal anachronism discounted
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by society," a "remnant of abandoned doctrine" that has been "left
... behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.'
Stripped of its wordiness, the "left behind" factor looks to
changed law (as opposed to changed facts, the next factor I will
discuss). If a case is a remnant, it may more readily be discarded.
This factor is obvious enough, and it obviously overlaps with both
"workability" and "reliance": If a case is an abandoned remnant (or
might be thought one), its continued existence becomes an efficiency
drag, impairing overall workability. It is a derelict in the stream of
the law. It also provokes a reliance problem. If litigants generally
can rely on precedent, a dilemma arises when a precedent is "out of
whack" with other precedents.
This, of course, raises an interesting (and inconvenient) question:
How did precedents get out of whack with each other in the first
place? How does something get to be a remnant of abandoned
doctrine? How did there come to be subsequent decisions that
undermined the first precedent? Did those cases fail to adhere to
stare decisis?69
The reality of the phenomenon is familiar to all lawyers and
students of the law, who are trained from Day Two of law school to
recognize how the second case in the book has departed, subtly or
abruptly, from the first case in the book. Day Three is all about
reconciling (or not) the first case and the second case, or choosing
which one to apply, now that a third, unanticipated case comes along.
This is the glorified, pseudo-mysterious "common law" method, so
painfully memorable to all.
How does the doctrine of stare decisis permit this? The only
logical answer is that, to whatever extent Case Two is in tension with
Case One, it was to precisely that extent a departure from the idea of
stare decisis. Occasionally, the departure or tension is acknowledged;
sometimes it is disguised, which creates efficiency/workability
problems.
Now we're on Day Three of the course. The third case has come
along. When should Case One be thought a remnant? How great a
degree of undermining needs to have been accomplished by Case
Two in order to conclude that Case One has been left behind?
Current stare decisis doctrine supplies no answer. There is no clear
standard other than the Case Three court's evaluation of the state of
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855, 857.
69. I have made a different version of this argument in prior writing. See Paulsen,
Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1560-61 & n.74.
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law created by the precedents in tension with one another. It seems
more accurate to say that the remnant-of-abandoned-doctrine
argument merely posits that it is better to overrule a case in two (or
more) steps than in one. But the remnant factor does not require that
there always be this intermediate step, and there appears no logical
reason why there should have to be one.
Consider the problem from the reverse perspective. Can the
same thing legitimately be done to Case Two as was done to Case
One? Could Case Three undermine Case Two and lean back toward
restoring the undermined rule of Case One? Current stare decisis
doctrine supplies no answer to this question, either. Indeed, it seems
fair to say that current doctrine generates two contradictory answers.
Sometimes the Supreme Court has said that the earlier case had been
undermined by subsequent cases, and that this makes it reasonable to
take the next step of overruling it outright. And sometimes the Court
has said that the undermining case (Case Two) improperly departed
from prior doctrine, and that its departure from the earlier precedent
weakens the case for adhering to it.
Again, Lawrence v. Texas (2003) is a prominent, recent, and
familiar example of the first approach.7" The Lawrence majority
argued that Bowers v. Hardwick had been undermined by Romer v.
Evans,7 which had struck down Colorado's state constitutional
provision prohibiting state or local statutory designations of sexual
orientation as a special protected class for purposes of
nondiscrimination laws. (Indeed, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Romer,
argued that the Court's result in that case was in serious tension with
its precedent decision upholding criminal statutes banning
homosexual conduct in Bowers.72) The notoriously cryptic majority
opinion in Romer essentially ignored Bowers. Lawrence subsequently
treated that fact as itself undermining Bowers's authority-as
pointing in the direction of "remnant" status. But why may not the
opposite judgment, that of Scalia's dissent, be reached-that Romer
was itself unsound, as a matter of stare decisis, because of its
disregard of Bowers?
The second case that Lawrence cited as undermining Bowers
was, ironically and somewhat amusingly, Casey itself.73 The irony is
that Casey rested, so strongly, on asserted grounds of stare decisis, but
70. Ironically, as we shall see, it is also an example of the contradictory second
approach. See infra text accompanying note 87.
71. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
72. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003).
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then became the basis for an argument that evolving legal principle,
articulated in Casey (1992), had undermined Bowers (1986) by
embracing the legitimacy of judicial creation or embrace of
substantive due process. Further complicating the roller coaster ride
is the fact that Washington v. Glucksberg74 (1997) had undermined
Casey's substantive due process analysis (and effectively embraced
Bowers's) but without explicitly disapproving of Casey.75  The
Bowers-to-Casey-to-Romer-to-Glucksberg-to-Lawrence quintuple
play thus presents the nearly comical illustration of Case One
undermined by Case Two and Case Three, where Case Two was all
about not undermining prior cases, yet its merits analysis was
undermined by Case Four, which implicitly restored Case One, but
then was ignored in Case Five.
A further irony involving Casey highlights the unpredictability of
the remnant-of-abandoned-doctrine factor. Under Casey's own
articulation of this factor, the Court might have overruled Roe as
readily as reaffirmed it. Surely, Roe had been significantly
undermined by Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,76 decided
three years earlier in 1989. Of course, the majority in Casey found
that Webster had not undermined Roe all that much-or at least not
in all respects. It read Webster's undermining effect narrowly, as
limited to Roe's trimester framework and to cases between Roe and
Webster that had expanded Roe's holding and logic77 (two of which
the Court in Casey in fact went ahead and overruled78). But the
Court just as easily might have read the undermining effect of
Webster more expansively; indeed, such a reading probably would
have been more plausible than the one upon which the joint opinion
ultimately settled. After all, Webster upheld state legislative
restrictions on abortion that were inconsistent with Roe's framework,
with a plurality holding that such restrictions should be evaluated on
nothing more stringent than a rational basis standard.79 The joint
opinion in Casey had to create an entirely new standard, not adopted
in any prior holding of the Court, and to overrule two cases, in order
to reach its new result-on the ground that the doctrine of stare
decisis required it.
74. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
75. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1557-61.
76. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
77. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857-58 (1992).
78. Id. at 882, overruling, in part, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
79. Webster, 492 U.S. at 518-20.
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The point here is not to re-argue Casey's outcome but to show
the uncertainty and ready manipulability of the remnant-of-
abandoned-doctrine / changed law / "left behind" element of stare
decisis doctrine. Simply and starkly put, if the fact of intervening
inconsistent decisions may provide a sufficient rationale, or even a
push-factor, in the direction of overruling a prior case; and if, as is
implied, the intervening inconsistent decisions are not themselves in
any way illegitimate or inconsistent with the notion of stare decisis,
then there appears no principled reason why the Court could not do
in one step what it says is entirely proper to do in two. The two-step
dance might seem more gradual, but it is still just a dance.
As noted, however, sometimes the Court says just the opposite-
sometimes even in the same case. No, the Court says, we will not take
the second step of the two-step and overrule, because Case Two-the
undermining case-was itself an improper departure from precedent;
that case is the one that needs to go.
Two familiar examples well illustrate this second approach.
Adarand, overruling Metro Broadcasting, remarked that what made
such overruling proper was that Metro Broadcasting was at odds
"with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience."80  "Metro Broadcasting
undermined important principles of this Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, established in a line of cases stretching back over [fifty]
years. '"8" This part of the Adarand opinion was joined only by Justice
O'Connor (writing) and Justice Kennedy, almost certainly because of
its labored, and mildly embarrassing, attempt to reconcile its stare
decisis reasoning with Casey's. (This lost the votes of those members
of the majority who had dissented in Casey-Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas.) But the O'Connor-Kennedy
discussion drew, fairly, on a long series of earlier Supreme Court
cases embracing the propriety of overruling cases that depart from
earlier, purportedly sounder precedent.'
A second major example (leaving aside the several cases collated
in Adarand) is Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.
Garcia abandoned National League of Cities v. Usery, in part (as
noted above) because the Court gave up, after nine years, trying to
apply National League of Cities's reading of the Tenth Amendment as
80. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 231-34 (1995) (Part III.C of the
opinion by O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J.) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119 (1940)).
81. Id. at 231.
82. Id. at 232-33.
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a freestanding, substantive limitation on the scope of enumerated
federal legislative power, finding the Court's standard
unmanageable.83 In doing so, the Court noted that National League
of Cities was in tension with earlier cases of the Court, and that it was
returning to the earlier approach, from which National League of
Cities had departed.'
Thus, any fair discussion of the remnant-of-abandoned-doctrine
factor of the Court's current stare decisis analysis must reckon with
the seemingly equal but opposite restoration-of-departed-from-
doctrine counter-factor. There are many other cases that might be
added to the "restoration" side of the ledger. Casey itself (ironically,
yet again) can be seen as a "restoration" of Roe following its
undermining in Webster and other cases. Dickerson v. United States
can be seen as a restoration of Miranda as a constitutional (or quasi-
constitutional) rule, following its undermining in a long line of
intervening cases that had held the Miranda rule to be one of
remedial, sub-constitutional judicial policy and evidence.85 Lawrence
casts itself, in part, as a "restoration" decision, too: not only had
Bowers been undermined by subsequent decisions; it had departed
from the course of the Court's earlier privacy decisions, including
Griswold v. Connecticut,86 which the Court in Lawrence took as its
starting point for analysis.87
How does current doctrine treat the question of when to go the
"remnant" route and when to go the "restoration" route? If Case
One and Case Two are in conflict (at some level), what forms the
basis for the choice? As I have written before, it is certainly not the
doctrine of stare decisis that dictates the decision: "The Court's
doctrine of stare decisis says that either course may be chosen."88 The
current doctrine of stare decisis provides that the existence of
inconsistent precedent decisions means that the Court may choose
which ones it wishes to follow. It supplies no standard for making
that choice.
83. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985); see supra
notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
84. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57.
85. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 451-54 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(setting forth the long line of cases that had regarded Miranda differently than the
Dickerson majority's recasting of its status as a constitutional rule).
86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
87. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65 (2003) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at
485).
88. Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1561.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Consider two decisions by the Roberts Court in 2007 on
significant constitutional issues. Gonzales v. Carhart9 upheld the
federal partial-birth abortion statute, notwithstanding the Court's
decision in Stenberg v. Carhart9° in 2000, invalidating a similar but
non-identical state partial-birth abortion prohibition.91 No sane,
informed observer thinks that the two decisions are consistent with
each other. No sane, informed observer would be persuaded that the
distinctions the Court in Gonzales (or "Carhart I") drew between the
federal statute and the state statute struck down in Stenberg (or
"Carhart I") should make a difference in constitutional outcome. No
sane, informed observer thinks that any of the Justices comprising the
majority in 2007 would have joined the majority in 2000. (Three of
them were members at both times and dissented in the 2000 case.).92
Yet Stenberg was not overruled in Gonzales, even though it is plain as
can be that every Justice in the 2007 majority believed that Stenberg
was wrongly decided. Instead, the case is explained and
distinguished-carefully, never with direct approval; and never with
direct disapproval-rather than scrapped.93  The doctrine of stare
decisis is nowhere discussed. The Court simply took step one of the
possible two-step: It undermined Stenberg greatly. Under the current
doctrine of stare decisis, a subsequent case might well conclude that
Stenberg has been left behind as a remnant of abandoned, discredited
doctrine. But it is also possible that a subsequent case might conclude
that Gonzales departed from the doctrine announced in Stenberg, and
that the Stenberg approach should be restored. Current stare decisis
doctrine does not say which course is more appropriate.
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
94
has certain similarities to Gonzales both in the Court's voting
alignment and in its treatment of earlier, seemingly-in-conflict
precedent. Five Justices (the same bloc of Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas and Alito that formed the majority in Gonzales) voted to
strike down section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(popularly known as "McCain-Feingold"), as applied to Wisconsin
Right to Life's issue advocacy ads shortly before an election. The
statute appeared to prohibit such ads and McConnell v. Federal
89. 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
90. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
91. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914.
92. See id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 956 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 980
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
93. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at-, 127 S. Ct. at 1629-31.
94. 551 U.S. __ 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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Election Commission95 had upheld that provision of the statute in
2003. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the lead opinion in Wisconsin
Right to Life, but garnered only one additional vote (Justice Alito's)
for the core substantive section finding that Wisconsin Right to Life's
as-applied constitutional challenge could prevail without the need to
re-examine McConnell's upholding of the provision on its face. "We
have no occasion to revisit that determination today," Roberts
wrote.96 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion (for himself and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas) declined to join in Chief Justice Roberts's
reasoning and instead set forth arguments why McConnell was wrong
and should be forthrightly overruled, and, further, why the doctrine
of stare decisis posed no proper barrier to such a holding.97
As with Gonzales-re-Stenberg, probably no reasonable person
would think that the as-applied invalidity of section 203, as explained
by the principles of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Wisconsin
Right to Life, could be squared comfortably with the rationale
upholding that section on its face in McConnell, or that either
Roberts or Justice Alito would so hold in a case unavoidably
presenting the issue.98 But the failure of Roberts and Alito to
embrace the Scalia-Kennedy-Thomas approach leaves Wisconsin
Right to Life as the first step of a possible two-step, with the
likelihood that McConnell's holding on this point will be "left behind"
as a remnant-but with the option open that Wisconsin Right to Life
could one day be treated as a narrow exception to, or a departure
from, the earlier, sounder precedent of McConnell.
The lesson one might take from this pair of cases, as a
description of the status of current doctrine of stare decisis, is that at
least some Justices on the Roberts Court as currently constituted-
and, most clearly so, the new Chief Justice-favor the two-step,
incremental approach. Those Justices are reluctant to overrule
precedent all at once, preferring first to render a precedent a remnant
of abandoned doctrine before going ahead and abandoning it. This,
however, is more a description of certain Justices' patterns of conduct
and disposition than a description of any clear doctrinal requirement.
The "rule" remains: a precedent that has been seriously undermined
by subsequent precedents may more readily be overruled, but
95. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
96. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
97. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2684-86 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas had been the three dissenters in McConnell. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 247-48.
98. Justice Alito hinted clearly at this in his one-paragraph concurrence. Wisc. Right
to Life, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring).
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sometimes the reverse will hold true, and the Court may choose to
reaffirm the earlier precedent and undermine the underminers. What
becomes a remnant-what is left behind-is a function of the Court's
subsequent decisions, not governed by any clear rules of stare decisis.
4. Changed Facts
Casey's stare decisis formula next asks "whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification."99  The way this is
expressed is slightly strange: facts have either changed "or come to
be seen ... differently." Thus, even if facts have not actually changed,
they might now be viewed differently. These real or perceived
changes in social facts are then relevant where they have robbed the
old rule of "application" or "justification." But if changes in factual
circumstances mean precedent no longer applies to very many real-
world situations-its relevance has been overtaken by historical
changes-that scarcely seems a reason to change the governing legal
interpretation and abandon the precedent. Presumably, the
precedent might still be right; it simply does not matter much any
more.
100
The second part of Casey's changed facts formulation is that
factual changes (or changed perceptions) may deprive a rule of its
justification. Again, as formulated, it is hard to see, in the abstract,
what the Court might mean. The Court's subsequent discussion
makes reasonably clear that this formulation is all about Brown v.
Board of Education. It is an effort to supply a justification for
Brown's overruling of Plessy that might distinguish that overruling
from others that might be urged upon the Court. The Casey joint
opinion spends considerable time discussing Brown as a unique and
exceptional situation.'' The burden of this explanation is to support
Brown's overruling of Plessy on the ground that social facts had
changed between 1896 and 1954, or that they had "come to be seen so
differently" that the rule of separate-but-equal segregation could no
99. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
100. In just the same way, the meaning of the Titles of Nobility Clauses, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 8; § 10, cl. 1, is not altered by the fact that the clauses have become essentially
dead letters in practice because the social phenomenon to which they are addressed has
disappeared. Changed facts may have robbed the clauses of much application, but that
would not be reason to change the interpretation of them, merely in order to give them
more work to do.
101. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-65. The joint opinion does much the same with respect to
the overruling of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which I will address more
briefly in the notes.
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longer be sustained. Casey's discussion of Brown warrants quotation
at length:
The Plessy Court considered "the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it." [Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)]. Whether, as a matter of historical
fact, the Justices in the Plessy majority believed this or not, this
understanding of the implication of segregation was the stated
justification for the Court's opinion. But this understanding of
the facts and the rule it was stated to justify were repudiated in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
As one commentator observed, the question before the Court
in Brown was "whether discrimination inheres in that
segregation which is imposed by law in the twentieth century in
certain specific states in the American Union. And that
question has meaning and can find an answer only on the
ground of history and of common knowledge about the facts of
life in the times and places aforesaid." Black, The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 421 (1960).
The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life by
observing that whatever may have been the understanding in
Plessy's time of the power of segregation to stigmatize those
who were segregated with a "badge of inferiority," it was clear
by 1954 that legally sanctioned segregation had just such an
effect, to the point that racially separate public educational
facilities were deemed inherently unequal. 374 U.S., at 494-
495. Society's understanding of the facts upon which a
constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally
different from the basis claimed for the decision in 1896. While
we think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, see Plessy,
supra, at 552-564 (Harlan, J., dissenting), we must also
recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was
so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954
that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone
not only justified but required.12
102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862-63 (emphasis added). In the preceding paragraphs, the
Court in Casey had explained the repudiation of the Lochner line of cases (named for
Lochner v. New York) in similar terms. The earlier decisions had "rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare." These facts "had prove[d] to be
untrue, and history's demonstration of their untruth not only justified but required the
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The Court in Casey seems to have been saying that Plessy was wrong
when decided but that the Brown Court's overruling of it was not
based on Plessy's wrongness but on changed facts only.
Brown is the reason, clearly, for the inclusion of the "changed
facts" factor in Casey. But the factor, as used in Casey to explain the
propriety of the Court's repudiation of Plessy (and of the Lochner v.
New York 3 line) entails a subtle and disturbing implication-almost
impossible to reconcile with Lhe other factors comprising the Court's
stare decisis doctrine-that the meaning of the Constitution properly
depends on how society views social facts at different times.
Brown is a marvelous decision, a wonderful restoration of a lost
original understanding of the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and a repudiation of a socially invented limitation on
that meaning by the Jim Crow era.1" But to the extent the Brown
opinion is vulnerable to criticism, it is because of its seeming reliance
on "changed facts" in the form of recent, trendy, contingent social
science-psychological or social studies-instead of announcing a
categorical, principled rejected of Plessy as wrong when decided and
continuously wrong for fifty-eight years.
There is, I think, a great danger in this. If what makes it proper
to change a legal interpretation is current social understandings of
facts, then it is hard to argue that it was improper to have made a legal
interpretation based on then-current social understandings of facts.
The changed facts argument as explicated in Casey permits one to
conclude that an awful case was not in fact awful when decided; it
simply would be awful to adhere to it now. The Court did not
actually make a grievous mistake back then; but it is right to change
the rule for modern times. So used, "changed facts" means never
having to say you're sorry. It is redemption without repentance.
The Court in Casey did not explicitly embrace this position. To
the contrary, it added the politically correct, but in this context
new choice of constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel [v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937)] announced." Id. at 861-62.
The Court in Casey concluded from these examples that "West Coast Hotel and
Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from those which
furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions." Id. at 863.
103. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. Earlier Supreme Court decisions had rejected racial exclusion from juries and
segregation in transportation. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)
(rejecting racial exclusion from jury service); R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445, 452-53 (17
Wall.) (1873) (rejecting segregation in transportation). For a brilliant, insightful argument
that Brown was right on historical grounds, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and
the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947, 955 (1995).
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throwaway, line that "we think Plessy was wrong the day it was
decided.""°5 But the logic of its discussion of what made overruling
Plessy proper would seem to lead to the conclusion that Plessy's
wrongness at the time was no essential part of what justified its
repudiation.
Surely, that is a proposition worth examining long and
questioning hard. One cannot read Plessy, or Giles v. Harris," or
Berea College v. Kentucky, °7 or any of the other American apartheid
cases, without sensing how deeply self-imprisoned the era was by its
own racist assumptions. The passage of Plessy quoted in Casey, set
forth above, shows this as well as any other. But combine that social
context of racism with the notion that the Constitution must be read
reasonably, in tune with the tenor of the times, and reflect current
social mores and values, and Plessy and its fellow travelers indeed
become rightly decided.
I pose this very issue as a discussion question for that day of the
basic Constitutional Law course: "Should the Constitution be
interpreted in accordance with prevailing social understandings of the
time?" My hope is that Plessy produces more than a few emphatic
"no" answers. (It does.) But it is amazing, and disturbing, how many
"yes" answers I receive. Some students evidently are not made
uncomfortable by the proposition that Plessy was right in its day. I
have had students argue seriously that Brown was right for its time
and Plessy was right for its time; the meaning of the Constitution
changes with the times and with folks' understanding of the proper
result dictated by social facts.
There is, of course, no need for this in order to vindicate Brown.
Segregation can be understood as violating equal protection in part
because of the social reality of segregation as discrimination-this
was Charles Black's insight in his justly renowned The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions'° 8- without thereby conceding that legal
segregation ever was anything other than a fundamental denial of
equality. The social reality of segregation as oppression was as clear
in 1896 as in 1954.
All of this is, of course, more a critique of the implications of the
"changed facts" factor than a dry description of current doctrine: If
105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
106. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
107. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
108. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960). As noted above, the Court in Casey cited and quoted from Professor Black's
article. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 862-63; supra text accompanying note 102.
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the changed facts notion is understood as an inquiry that permits
overruling cases whenever social understandings, mores, and values
have changed substantially, it has truly sweeping jurisprudential
implications. "Changed facts," so understood, would be the stare
decisis factor that swallowed stare decisis: courts should decide cases
as current values dictate, and legitimately may overrule anything in
their way. There is substantial support for this view in Casey's
discussion of what permitted overruling Lochner and Plessy. To the
extent Casey's discussion can be read to support this view, what it
permits is nearly complete judicial discretion to decide whether or not
things have changed sufficiently to permit overruling an earlier case.
So much for "stare decisis."
At the same time, this seems to overstate the Casey Court's
intention. The discussion of Lochner to West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish,1"9 and Plessy to Brown, might be understood to stand for
something somewhat narrower: Where the Court had justified its
decision at the time, at least in substantial part, by making factual
statements or proceeding from factual premises that we would now
conclude were simply wrong as a matter of fact, the inclusion of such
factual misstatements within the stated rationale of decision gives a
subsequent court special justification for overruling the precedent-
that is, a justification for overruling beyond the fact of legal error.
The Court has frequently spoken of the need for a "special
justification" for overruling-something in addition to a conclusion
that the prior interpretation was wrong as a matter of law.1"' On this
narrower view, a precedent's reliance on wrong facts supplies this
justification. The subsequent Court may overrule if the precedent
was wrong on the law and said something wrong about social facts,
too."l' Under this reading, the decisions in Lochner and Plessy, by
revealing some of the Court's views on matters of social fact, gave
subsequent Courts something to seize upon to justify overruling-
something they otherwise would not have had.
This is plausible, but not entirely satisfying. Would it really have
mattered if Plessy had been a drier, one-paragraph opinion saying, in
109. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
110. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)
(collecting cases); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
111. Abraham Lincoln, criticizing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), indicated as part of his views of the force of judicial precedent that a Supreme
Court decision should not be regarded as authoritative and binding where "based on
assumed historical facts which are not really true." Abraham Lincoln, President of the
U.S., Address at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 390-92 (Library of Am. ed. 1989).
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essence, "The amendment uses the word 'equal'; it does not prohibit
separate facilities or separation of the races in terms. As long as
separate facilities are equal, there is no constitutional violation,"
without any further discussion of social facts?
A final possibility, narrower yet, seems the best way to
understand this factor, though it is harder to square with the Court's
discussion: changes in facts, in the times, or in social conditions, may
reveal, or help to make clear, that a prior decision always was wrong
as a matter of law; the Court was simply blinded by social context,
social facts, or the latest trendy science or social science at the time of
the error.12 With changed context and social understandings, the
scales have dropped from our eyes. So understood, this factor is more
of a warning against basing constitutional interpretation on shifting
social understandings of facts than an embrace of it.
Under this view, it would be something of a misnomer to label
this factor "changed facts," as if to suggest that changed facts or
changed views of social facts justify changed interpretations of the
law. Changed facts, or new perspectives, simply help reveal that the
old interpretation was wrong. Interestingly, under this understanding
of "changed facts," this element of current doctrine is not really an
argument about stare decisis, in the sense of addressing a reason to
adhere or not adhere to a decision "whether or not mistaken.""' 3 It is
a point about how and when one might come to realize that a decision
was mistaken. It is an argument for the propriety of overruling a
wrong decision demonstrated to be a wrong decision.
Once again, it must be pointed out that the Court in Casey did
not say all of this; its discussion was much more cursory, superficial,
and vague. But this is all part of the descriptive problem. In the end,
the factor of changed facts is unclear on a number of scores. It can be
understood to mean three entirely different things: one of which the
Court seems to have said, but the logic of which is more extreme than
the Court possibly could have intended; a second of which makes
changed facts merely a pretense to be seized upon; and third of which
seems to imply that focusing on different understandings of social
facts is precisely the wrong thing upon which to base a decision and is
evidence of a prior case's defects. It is also unclear exactly what types
of changed facts are sufficient and how much social facts need to have
112. I add "science" to "social science." Buck v. Bell's outrageous embrace of eugenic
understandings probably reflected the elite "scientific" consensus of the day. 274 U.S. 200,
207 (1927).
113. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
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changed in order to counsel more in favor of overruling. Social
understandings of homosexuality were different in 2003 than in 1986;
but social understandings of abortion were different in 1992 than in
1973, too. And finally, the relationship of this factor to others, and its
relative weight, is not at all clear. It is unclear whether a change in
facts is necessary in order to overrule a precedent, or whether it is
ever sufficient on its own to justify overruling.
5. Judicial Integrity
The final factor in Casey's stare decisis analysis is a wide-ranging
one that occupies several pages and consumes a great deal of the
Casey Court's rhetorical attention. It goes by various names, but
might usefully, if imprecisely, be termed "judicial integrity.""' 4 It is
reflected in that part of Casey's discussion that emphasizes how
"frequent overruling would overtax the country's belief in the Court's
good faith," how overruling "under fire" a "watershed" decision
"would subvert the Court's legitimacy"; how the country would suffer
a "loss of confidence in the judiciary" if those who were "tested by
following" the Court's decision found that they had paid a price for
nothing; and how the "promise of constancy, once given," binds the
Court and breaching it "would be nothing less than a breach of
faith.""''
I have criticized this grandiose, vain, self-absorbed cluster of
notions in other writing'16 and continue to think that criticism
warranted. But here I would like merely to describe this factor as
accurately as possible, for purposes of promoting assessment (which I
make in the next Part of this Article) of whether the doctrine of stare
decisis the Court has fashioned satisfies the standards the Court has
set for itself. Shorn of the Court's overwrought formulations, the
"judicial integrity" factor asks an understandable question: whether,
even if a precedent is thought erroneous, it would seem arbitrary,
capricious, or fickle for the Court to be changing its mind too often or
too readily (especially if its decisions change along with personnel
changes) or to be changing its interpretation in response to public, or
political, or even scholarly criticism or pressure. Would this not,
sometimes, look bad? Might it even be bad-unfair, in some sense,
114. For further discussion, see Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1564-67.
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866-68.
116. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1564-67; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book
Review, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 225-33 (1993) (reviewing ROBERT A. BURT, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICr (1992)).
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for the Court to change its mind, especially as a result of political or
personnel changes?
The difficulty lies in transforming this intuition into a principled
rule, susceptible of consistent application. Sometimes the Court says
that maintaining public perceptions of "judicial integrity" requires the
Court to adhere to a prior case, even if wrong. And sometimes the
Court says maintaining such perceptions requires the Court not to
adhere to a prior case precisely because it is wrong. The Court is
concerned with the politics of its own power, and this plays into its
evaluation of whether, when, and which precedents may be overruled.
But the problem is that the politics of judicial power can cut in
different directions, depending on the issue at hand. It is hard to find
coherent principle in such a standard.
It is even harder to find principled application. In the
perceptions-of-judicial-integrity-requires-adhering-to-precedent
category, for example, one finds Casey reaffirming Roe. In the
judicial-integrity-requires-not-adhering category, one finds Lawrence
overruling Bowers and Brown overruling Plessy. In Casey, with
respect to criticism of the Court's abortion precedents, one finds the
Court saying that "to overrule under fire ... would subvert the
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question"'17 because " 'the
vitality of ... constitutional principles ... cannot be allowed to yield
simply because of disagreement with them.' "118 In Lawrence, with
respect to homosexual sodomy laws, one finds the Court saying that a
factor in favor of overruling Bowers is the fact that "criticism of
Bowers has been substantial and continuing." '119
It is almost too easy to point out that these are direct
contradictions. But that is an accurate description of the content of
the current doctrine of stare decisis with respect to this particular
factor-and not an entirely surprising one since this factor is
addressed to issues of politics, power, and perception. And so it
stands as a fair description of "judicial integrity" that the impact of
overruling-versus-adhering-to a case on public perceptions of judicial
integrity will sometimes cut one way and sometimes cut the other
way, with no clear, principled standard to control the decision.
So that is the state of current stare decisis doctrine: The factors
are (1) workability, (2) reliance, (3) remnant of abandoned doctrine,
117. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
118. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955)).
119. Lawrence v.Texas, 539 U.S. 558,576 (2003).
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(4) changed facts, and (5) judicial integrity. Each of the factors
contains internal contradictions. Each admits of conflicting
applications, and there are examples of such conflicts in each
category. Each factor suffers from certain major analytic defects and
unclarity. The relationship of each factor to the others, and their
relative weight, is not defined. No factor is necessarily necessary. No
factor is sufficient.
II. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS TO THE DOCTRINE
OF STARE DECISIS
How does the current doctrine of stare decisis fare under these
five criteria? Should the current doctrine of stare decisis be adhered
to because it well serves the policies of workability-efficiency,
protection of reliance interests, stability and predictability, and
protection of judicial integrity? Or, perhaps, have changed facts, or
changed law, undermined the doctrine in ways that might counsel in
favor of it being overruled?
If one were to apply Casey's criteria fairly, to the question of
whether the current decisional law of precedent should be followed, it
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the current doctrine of stare
decisis does not require adherence to the current doctrine of stare
decisis. Ironically, the doctrine, to the extent it can be thought to
yield any clear direction, counsels in favor of overruling the doctrine.
Nothing in any of the criteria set forth in Casey and subsequent
cases-none of the factors of workability, reliance, changed
law / remnant, changed facts, or judicial integrity-points in the
direction of standing by what the Court has decided about when
precedent should be followed. To the contrary, the current doctrine
of stare decisis, applied to the current doctrine of stare decisis, tends
to suggest that the doctrine undermines nearly all of the policies that
the doctrine is supposed to serve. Current stare decisis doctrine
therefore properly may, and even should, be abandoned, consistent
with the evaluative criteria established by current stare decisis
doctrine. To put it bluntly: The doctrine of stare decisis, as presently
formulated, constitutes its own circular firing squad.
The preceding Part's detailed description and discussion of
current stare decisis law admits of a quick tour through current
doctrine in terms of the goals it has set for itself. I will take up each
criterion of the doctrine, as applied to current stare decisis doctrine as
a whole.
1200 [Vol. 86
2008] DOES STARE DECISIS REQUIRE STARE DECISIS? 1201
A. Workability
Consider first "workability," and its companion value, the
promotion of judicial efficiency: Does the current doctrine and
practice of stare decisis supply a workable, coherent, readily
administrable set of clear principles that promotes clarity, efficiency
and predictability in adjudication, and that economizes on judicial
work? Plainly not. As demonstrated above, the current doctrine of
stare decisis supplies no clear standards. It is a laundry list mish-mash
of factors, each of which has serious problems of unclarity and
imprecision of application. The relative weight of each factor is also
unclear-it is unspecified-as is the relationship of each to the others.
The workability inquiry, which asks whether a line of decisions
supplies reasonably clear criteria susceptible of principled,
predictable judicial application, itself fails to do so, but instead has
degenerated into an ad hoc gestalt judicial inquiry, capable of being
applied in either direction depending on the Court's preferences.
That is precisely what the doctrine, as formulated, says is not the
objective."'
The reliance standard is no less unworkable and unprincipled,
given that the Court is not clear on what legitimately constitutes
reliance, has contradicted itself in application of this standard, and
sometimes credits "social reliance" and sometimes does not,
depending on the particular situation. The Court's use of reliance has
been unpredictable and, thus, unworkable and inefficient. 2'
Changed law / remnant of abandoned doctrine, as shown above,
is a push-me-pull-you inquiry that permits the Court to go in either of
two opposing directions. Inconsistent precedents mean either that a
subsequent precedent has undermined a prior one, permitting the
earlier case's overruling, or that a subsequent precedent has
improperly departed from the earlier one, permitting an overruling of
the departing case and a restoration of the earlier one. There is no
clear standard for choosing one course over the other; and the Court
has, in practice, done each, in different circumstances, depending on
what appears to be nothing more than its preferences. The inquiry
may not be wholly unworkable, in the sense of being unmanageable.
But it is plainly not workable in the sense of providing principled
standards susceptible of, and producing, predictable and principled
applications.'22
120. See supra text accompanying notes 21-43.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 46-67.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 68-98.
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As to "changed facts," the problem is identical. This factor has
failed to supply a clear, coherent standard because it permits the
Court to judge, seemingly ad hoc, whether or not it wishes to change
a rule based on changed social situations. Again, sometimes it does,
and sometimes it does not.' 23
And finally, "judicial integrity" is a political factor capable of
(and often displaying) political manipulation. It is standardless and
not susceptible of principled application. Sometimes the goal of
promoting public perceptions of the integrity of the judiciary leads
the Court to declare that it is imperative that precedents be
reaffirmed, for appearances' sake. Sometimes the goal of promoting
public perceptions of the integrity of the judiciary leads the Court to
declare that it is imperative that wrong precedents be overruled, in
124order to restore justice.
Plainly, current stare decisis doctrine is unworkable and
inefficient. It supplies no standards of any meaningful content. What
criteria it announces are susceptible of contradictory applications. It
does not promote coherence or stability in the law; it simply adds
another layer of confusing analysis, and it is unclear what, if anything,
this actually adds. The application of the Court's doctrine of stare
decisis shows results that are inconsistent, unpredictable, and
unprincipled. The rule on the ground is that Courts follow precedent,
except when they don't. And that is no rule at all.
B. Reliance
If reliance is the residue of predictability and stability, and if one
of the objects of the doctrine of stare decisis is to protect reasonable,
vested reliance interests, current doctrine must be judged a failure on
this score as well. Surely, no reasonable person familiar with the
Court's doctrine and practice of precedent would rely on current stare
decisis doctrine remaining stable. No reasonable person would rely
on the doctrine being applied in a consistent and predictable fashion.
And no reasonable person would rely on the Court's adhering, in any
given instance, to a decision it has concluded is wrong, simply for
reasons of stare decisis. The Court's reliance on reliance has been
unreliable. The Court finds protection-worthy reliance interests in all
kinds of different things, when it suits its purposes (such as social
reliance in a rule remaining the same because people desire it or are
123. See supra text accompanying notes 99-113.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
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accustomed to it), 125 but sometimes will simply rush on past such
considerations or dismiss them as incidental.
126
The current doctrine of stare decisis does not seem like the kind
of legal formulation that causes persons to invest resources or
otherwise sink costs. It is not the type of legal rule or standard to
which society has become accustomed (as Miranda is claimed to be, in
Dickerson) or around which people have ordered their lives or
thinking (as Roe is claimed to be, in Casey). Unlike "watershed"
social policy decisions, which often provoke controversy, no one is
"tested by following" the doctrine of stare decisis itself. The doctrine
is not a substantive one. It is second-order "lawyer's law" that most
sensible members of the public regard as either inscrutable or self-
evidently manipulable. Sensible lawyers do not rely on the doctrine
either. In terms of whether the doctrine of stare decisis is itself stable
and reliable, the best that a highly sophisticated lawyer could advise a
client is that the Court will adhere to precedents it wants to adhere to
(like Roe or Miranda); that it will overrule precedents it wants to
overrule (like Bowers or Metro Broadcasting); that such a decision
will almost always actually turn on merits or policy factors quite apart
from precedent; and that, at most, prior precedent, and the Court's
doctrine and precedent about precedent, will be something the Court
may feel it needs to discuss and explain. But this never serves as
much of a barrier to a changed decision to which the Court otherwise
is committed.
In short, current doctrine-and practice-of stare decisis has not
generated reasonable reliance interests that would counsel in favor of
adhering to current doctrine.
C. Remnant of Abandoned Doctrine
Has the doctrine of stare decisis remained stable and consistent
over time, or has it been undermined by subsequent cases? At the
North Carolina Law Review Symposium in which this paper was
presented in preliminary form, one of the questioners asked whether
it even made sense to organize and discuss the doctrine of stare
decisis in terms of Casey's articulation of its factors. So much has
happened in the fifteen years since Casey, with respect to the Court's
treatment of precedent in constitutional cases; so many times has the
doctrine been refined, modified, or departed from, that (the challenge
125. Casey and Dickerson are cases of this sort. See supra text accompanying notes 52-
57.
126. Lawrence is a case of this sort. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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goes) it makes little sense to speak of the doctrine as Casey did.
Rather, the doctrine of stare decisis has remained "fluid" and evolved
to respond to new situations.
Just so! To the extent this observation is correct (which is
considerable), it renders the doctrine of stare decisis, as formulated in
Casey, a remnant of abandoned doctrine. If so, that is a reason why it
may be abandoned, under Casey's own criteria. Surely, it is correct to
observe that the Casey formulation was the high-water mark in the
Court's invocation of constitutional precedent as a constraining force.
Since Casey was decided in 1992, the waters have receded
considerably. In fact, the process started in Casey itself, which despite
its high-church rhetoric of the necessity of adhering to precedent,
overruled two abortion cases."l 7 Two years later, in 1994, Adarand
overruled Metro Broadcasting, with two crucial members of the Casey
majority joining in a stare decisis discussion, irreconcilable with
Casey's, in which they asserted the propriety of overruling a case that
had marked a departure from earlier law, in order to restore a prior,
sounder antecedent understanding. 12 Three years after that, in 1997,
Agostini v. Felton129 overruled Aguilar v. Felton's3 ° aggressive
misinterpretation of the Establishment Clause, on the ground that it
had gone too far and been undermined by subsequent decisions.'
Adarand and Agostini surely undermined Casey's stare decisis
doctrine, but without direct acknowledgement that they were doing
so. Also in 1997, Glucksberg's embrace of a very narrow substantive
due process analysis as a limiting principle undermined Casey's
substantive due process analysis.
13 2
Cutting sharply in the other direction, Dickerson, decided in
2000, reaffirmed Miranda, recasting intervening decisions inconsistent
with the Court's restoration of Miranda, in part on social reliance
grounds.133 One effect Dickerson might be thought to have had was
to revitalize Casey-esque stare decisis doctrine, which had been
undermined by Adarand and Agostini.
127. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1537 & n.2 (discussing Casey's overruling
of Akron and Thornburgh).
128. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 231-34 (1995), overruling Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
129. 521 U.S. 203 (1979).
130. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
131. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235-36, overruling Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402.
132. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1557-60 (discussing Glucksberg as
undermining Roe and Casey's substantive due process holding, leaving the Court's
abortion decisions to rest on principles of stare decisis).
133. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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But then, dramatically, the Court in 2003 seemed to leave behind
its strong version of stare decisis, set forth in Casey and deployed in
Dickerson, distinguishing it (however unpersuasively) into near-
oblivion in Lawrence v. Texas. Lawrence is a minor landmark in
judicial exposition of the doctrine of stare decisis-but in the opposite
direction of Casey. Not only did Lawrence overrule a major
constitutional case (Bowers), it did so by readopting the sweeping
view of substantive due process the Court had rejected in Glucksberg,
ironically embracing Casey for its substantive due process thinking
but not for its stare decisis thinking."' The twin death penalty
overrulings of 2002 and 2005, Atkins and Roper, are more in the
Adarand-Agostini-Lawrence pattern and less in the Casey-Dickerson
pattern."' And finally, two of the big cases of 2007, Gonzales v.
Carhart and Wisconsin Right to Life, whose results cannot sensibly be
reconciled with the cases they all-but-overrule (Stenberg v. Carhart
and McConnell v. FEC), must be counted in the genre of cases
undermining Casey's stare decisis reasoning, leaving it arguably an
empty shell-a test abandoned in every way except forthrightly.136
In terms of the "remnant" standard then, it is fair to observe that,
though the Court's actions have not been perfectly consistent (again,
undermining workability and reliance), the doctrinal evolution of the
Court's decisions has left Casey's discussion of stare decisis very much
left behind. In practice, the doctrine is abandoned whenever the
Court wishes to abandon it. The doctrine of stare decisis, as discussed
in Casey, would thus seem to suggest that the doctrine of stare decisis
has itself become, or is rapidly becoming, a remnant of abandoned
doctrine. If subsequent decisions are fully as authoritative as to the
meaning and content of current stare decisis doctrine (and how could
they not be, consistent with such doctrine?), then there obviously has
been a lot of undermining of the doctrine of stare decisis going on.
To borrow Justice O'Connor's words (penned for a different
occasion), the doctrine of stare decisis (in terms of the Roe
framework) "is on a collision course with itself." '37
134. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74, 577 (2003); see supra text accompanying
notes 58-63, 70-75.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 89-98.
137. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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D. Changed Facts
Have social or political facts changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to undermine the justification for continued adherence
to the current doctrine of stare decisis? This is genuinely hard to
evaluate, in part because of the difficulties presented by the "changed
facts" factor itself. If changes in social understandings, without more,
permit changes in constitutional doctrine, there is no reason why one
could not conclude that social understandings of the premises on
which the doctrine of stare decisis rests have changed, though it is
unclear how one would measure such a thing. If this factor is better
understood as counseling in favor of overruling when changed social
contexts have helped reveal the error of the original rule, again there
is no reason why this could not be the case with respect to the
doctrine of stare decisis. But again this is hard to evaluate.
Finally, if this factor is understood as especially favoring
overruling when a precedent opinion invoked factual assumptions or
premises in support of its rationale, and those "facts" (whether hard
facts or social facts) are now demonstrated to be false or are now
"seen ... differently"-the understanding perhaps best supported by
Casey's lengthy discussion of Lochner and Plessy'38-there is quite an
excellent chance that these facts have changed. It is hard to tell, of
course. As discussed above, whether or not there have been material
changes in facts, or in how they are now viewed, seems to be largely
in the eyes of the beholding subsequent Court. But this problem is
diminished, at least a little bit, if the relevant "facts" are ones that can
be identified as factual statements or assertions, now shown to be
wrong, contained in the precedent decision itself. Thus, to the extent
this factor may be taken seriously, it is useful to examine whether
there were indeed factual assumptions or premises contained in the
Casey opinion, in support of its articulation of a grand doctrine of
stare decisis, analogous to the factual assumptions or premises that
had been recited in support of Lochner and Plessy, the paradigm
cases noted by the Casey Court as decisions predicated on false
factual views.
There are some such quasi-factual (or pseudo-factual) assertions,
or premises, in Casey's stare decisis section. They are set forth in the
extended final section of the Court's stare decisis analysis, discussing
what I have termed the "perceptions of judicial integrity" factor. To
the extent that adherence to precedent was justified, in Casey, in part
138. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833, 861-64 (1992). See
generally supra text accompanying notes 79-92 (discussing the "changed facts" factor).
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on the ground that this is what the people expect of the Court, that is,
presumably, an empirically testable proposition. Similarly, to the
extent the Court's rationale for stare decisis was that the people's
"belief in themselves" was not "separable" from their confidence in
the Court and that this confidence would be undermined by too
frequent overrulings, that too is presumably an empirically testable
"fact."' 39 The Court's "facts" might prove false, or views of them may
have changed.
To be sure, Casey's windy flights of rhetorical excess were
probably just that, and can be criticized on this ground. But there
they are. Taking the doctrine of stare decisis seriously, on its own
terms-and treating the Casey opinion's rhetoric on this score
seriously, as if it deserves to be taken seriously-makes these
statements fair ground for empirical testing (or even subjective
judgment, apparently). When the Court asserts, in Casey, that the
people's "belief in themselves" as a "people who aspire to live
according to the rule of law ... is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their
constitutional cases and speak before all others for their
constitutional ideals,""14 it is making a factual assertion, just as the
Court in Plessy was making a factual assertion when it said that any
perception that enforced racial separation implied discrimination
would be "solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.''. They are the sorts of claims where someone,
coming across them, could just say, "that ain't so!" They are, in
theory, testable: a sophisticated social science survey, or even a
public opinion poll, could evaluate whether people, today, truly do
think that their belief in themselves as governed by the rule of law is
connected to their views of whether the Supreme Court should
adhere to past decisions, even where the Court has concluded that
those decisions were legally wrong. (Similarly, one might have sought
to measure statistically whether separate-but-equal was understood
by whites, as well as blacks, as signifying anything about believed
racial inferiority.)
To be sure, constitutional law ought not turn on such almost-silly
inquiries. It should consist of application of the original meaning of
the words of the written Constitution, in context, where they supply a
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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rule or standard that governs the issue at hand. 142 It is almost comical
to discuss the proposition that the decision to adhere to or overrule a
particular legal doctrine would turn on whether a poll showed that
this would improve how people viewed the Supreme Court. But that
is exactly what one of the Court's stated stare decisis criteria (the one
I return to next) appears to say. And if the Court's factual
assumptions about public perceptions indeed formed part of the
justification for the current doctrine of stare decisis, then another
factor in the doctrine--changed facts-justifies not adhering to that
doctrine if the facts about public perceptions have changed, if new
knowledge has revealed the Court's factual assumptions always to
have been wrong, or simply if those facts have now "come to be seen"
differently.
In short, the "changed facts" factor likewise could come to be
seen as supporting the overruling of current stare decisis doctrine.
E. Judicial Integrity
Finally, there is the grab-bag of considerations concerning public
perceptions of judicial integrity. Does the furtherance of notions of
(or public perceptions of) judicial integrity require adherence to the
current doctrine of stare decisis? Casey seems to require us to ask
whether the current doctrine and practice of stare decisis is one on
which the Court has "staked its authority" or "legitimacy" such that
departure from it would undermine the people's belief in themselves
and in the Court.
143
Surely any such assertion should be met with considerable
skepticism, if not outright laughter. Even assuming one could tell
when a case is a "watershed" or not,'" and whether it was a good
watershed or a bad one, 45 the doctrine of stare decisis as formulated
by the Court in Casey does not appear to be a prime candidate for
such exalted status. Doubtless, few folks have been "tested by
following" the unweighted assortment of factors that comprise the
Court's stated doctrine of precedent. The Court in Casey did not say
142. For a defense of my methodological premises of original-meaning-textualism, see
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1124-48 (2003). See also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009).
143. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
144. Id. at 867.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18. Compare id. at 867-68, with Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003)
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that the Court had staked its authority on the idea of following
precedent. It did not even appear to stake its authority on the idea of
sometimes following precedent. Rather, it said that it had staked its
authority on Roe and that it therefore might appear to some to be a
breach of faith for the Court to retreat from the ground it had
assumed. The doctrine of stare decisis almost certainly does not have
the same stature.
Moreover, more sensible notions of "judicial integrity" would
seem to require acknowledgment that stare decisis is a doctrine of
convenience, endlessly pliable, followed only when desired, and
almost always invoked as a makeweight. I have elsewhere called it a
"Grand Hoax."'4 6  At the very least, minimal candor compels
recognition of the fact that the doctrine is imprecise, ad hoc, and can
be invoked to support just about any result. The emperor has no
clothes.
Recognize this, and the game is nearly up. If the doctrine of
stare decisis, despite the arguments made for it in Casey, is
unworkable, unreliable, unstable, unpredictable, and unprincipled,
how can one with a straight face champion the doctrine as serving the
value of promoting public perceptions of judicial integrity?
To review and recapitulate: the Court's current doctrine of stare
decisis is unworkable, unsusceptible to principled application,
inconsistent, unpredictable, and so unreliable as not to justify reliance
upon it. The stated doctrine, as formulated in Casey, has been so
greatly undermined by subsequent decisions and applications of the
doctrine of stare decisis as to render the doctrine of stare decisis itself
a remnant of abandoned doctrine. The doctrine does not further
perceptions of judicial integrity, but probably undermines them. The
circular firing squad, when ordered to fire, destroys itself.
III. IF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS PERMITS
ABANDONING OR MODIFYING THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF STARE
DECISIS, WHAT SHOULD REPLACE IT?
What should one do with a doctrine that is such a failure on its
own terms? Given the irony that the current doctrine of stare decisis
emphatically does not require adherence to the current doctrine of
stare decisis, but suggests that it may and should be modified or
replaced, what should replace it?
146. See Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk, supra note 3, at 681.
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One bright idea might be to move in the direction of much
stricter adherence to precedent-something closer to absolute stare
decisis. The double paradox with such a view is that, in the first place,
such a move would be, well, unprecedented-unsupported by
anything the Court has ever said about the authority of precedent. In
the second place (and relatedly), there is the paradox that such a new,
improved, better, stronger, faster stare decisis would be inconsistent
with the act of adopting such a new rule. Given current doctrine, and
long unsteady practice, for the judiciary to create a far stricter rule of
stare decisis would be an act of activism overruling or drastically
overhauling much prior law. This would be contrary to the far stricter
rule of stare decisis being proposed.
No. The only direction in which the doctrine could be changed
and not self-destruct, is in the direction of even looser "stare decisis."
To be sure, it is hard to imagine a doctrine of stare decisis much
looser than current doctrine is, in practice, but at least this result
could be made more honest. This would require disapproval of the
tone, and some of the substance, of Casey's discussion. It would
require acknowledging that the decision to adhere to precedent or
depart from it is really just a product of ad hoc, case-by-case
decisionmaking. (The only problem is that the label "stare decisis"
does not seem particularly apt for such a refashioned doctrine of
precedent.)
All of this points in the direction of what I think is the proper
approach. The doctrine of stare decisis may, and should be replaced
by a much simpler, cleaner theory of the proper role of precedent in
constitutional adjudication. The primary inquiry, in any situation, is
whether a prior decision (or line of decisions) is right or wrong, on
independent interpretive criteria one thinks are correct on grounds
other than precedent.147 In conducting such an inquiry, precedent can
serve an important "information function" of furnishing what one
would hope would be useful, thoughtful arguments of prior
interpreters concerning the proper understanding and application of a
particular constitutional provision. This can promote efficiency: a
subsequent interpreter need not re-invent the interpretive wheel for
every issue. He or she may read prior opinions, with care but
independent judgment, and use good prior reasoning as an efficient
shortcut to correct conclusions today. This can also multiply
competence: a subsequent interpreter may stand on the shoulders of
147. We can have a separate, longer discussion about what those criteria are. See
generally Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 142.
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others; moreover, a less competent or less confident interpreter may
follow in others' footsteps, unless and until fully persuaded that the
path is legally wrong. But where an interpreter is fully persuaded,
after full and careful consideration of all relevant information,
including the decisions of those who have gone before, that the
standing interpretation is simply wrong, the interpreter should
(indeed, I have argued elsewhere, he must) follow what he is
persuaded is the correct interpretation of the Constitution, not what
he has concluded is the incorrect interpretation of judges who have
gone before him. This strikes me as a much more modest, sensible,
coherent doctrine of precedent-one that does not make grandiose
claims or require a grand theory that cannot be satisfied. It also
appears to have been the original understanding of precedent, to
boot. a
I have addressed this question at greater length in other writing,
arguing that stare decisis is essentially inconsistent with first
principles of constitutional law and that the doctrine should be
abandoned entirely.1 49 Precedent may serve legitimate informative
functions, and may serve as a baseline against which departing
decisions need to justify themselves, 50 but stare decisis, in the strong
sense of adhering to a decision one otherwise would conclude is
wrong-the sense in which Casey uses it to adhere to Roe "whether or
not mistaken" and the only sense in which the doctrine has
meaningful force-is impossible to justify on first principles.
My point in this Article has been more limited: The current
doctrine of stare decisis is impossible to justify on its own premises.
There are those for whom an appeal to first principles simply does not
stir the heart. If a doctrine works, tolerably well-if it is sensible,
reasonable, practical, logical-that, for them, is enough. For such
folk, this Article is intended as a virus injected into their often
unexamined systems of legal thought and (hopefully) causing
disruption to their complacent, ingrained notions about precedent.
But I did not create the virus; I am merely identifying and
describing it. The virus is the current doctrine of stare decisis itself.
And if a fair application of that doctrine, to itself, produces a system
crash, surely it is time to reexamine that system and question whether
148. See Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1571-78.
149. Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting, supra note 3, at 290-91; Paulsen, Irrepressible
Myth, supra note 3, at 2731-34.
150. Paulsen, Abrogating, supra note 3, at 1544-48.
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the current doctrine of stare decisis really should be retained as a part
of our system of constitutional law.
